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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION, 
Defendant / Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent. 
Case No. 20081054-SC 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals issued its decision in this action on November 28, 2008. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003 
(Addendum A). A timely petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by the defendant. This 
Court granted that petition, limited to two questions stated by the Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West 
2009). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Certiorari was granted to consider the following two questions. 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of 
relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view. 
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2. Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall severance 
damages. 
In its order of June 23,2010, this Court requested "the parties to brief the question 
of whether Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (UT 2007) should 
be overruled on constitutional grounds." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, § 22 [Private property for public usej 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West 2009). Compensation and damages — How 
assessed. 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to 
the proceedings, and determine and assess: 
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
pertaining to the realty; 
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property; and 
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest in each shall be separately assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or 
interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed 
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by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under Subsection (2), the 
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion 
taken; but if the benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted 
from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the 
value of the portion taken; 
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water 
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or 
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the 
system's carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment; 
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to 
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, taking 
into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and harvesting the 
crops; and 
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages 
separately. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an interlocutory order that granted certain motions in limine 
filed by UDOT. R. 862-67, a copy is attached as Addendum B. Defendant filed its 
petition for an interlocutory appeal on January 16, 2008. R. 875. This action came within 
the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West 
2009). On January 17,2008, this Court transferred the petition to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On 
January 30, 2008, that court granted the defendant's petition as to "[w]hether the trial 
court erred in excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the 
remaining property." R. 895. 
On November 28, 2008, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order. 
Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003. The 
court held that the appurtenant easement of view only applied to a public road that 
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abutted the property in question. Id. at ^3. The court also rejected the defendant's claim 
that it should be compensated for an alleged loss of visibility from 1-15. Id at f 5 n.2. 
Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court that was granted. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts concerning the location of Admiral Beverage's property and how it 
relates to 1-15 are taken from Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision and Order of October 
31,2005. R. 492-502 (a copy is attached hereto as Addendum A). The district court 
found that the facts were not "disputed in any material way." R. 493. Defendant has 
never claimed that there was a material issue of fact. 
Admiral Beverage owns two adjacent lots that are west of 1-15 in Salt Lake 
County. The property abuts the west side of 500 West, a surface street owned by Salt 
Lake City, which acts as a frontage road in that area. 500 West runs between Admiral 
Beverage's property and 1-15. R. 664 (map of Admiral Beverage's property showing its 
relationship with 1-15 and the portions to be condemned - a copy is attached as 
Addendum C). 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the 
freeway in that area was moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 
500 West frontage road also be moved further to the west and onto the east 
side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are now 




The parcels of land taken from Admiral Beverage for the project were used for the 
reconstruction of 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake City. As part of the 
reconstruction, 500 West was moved farther west and partially onto Admiral Beverage's 
property. The changes were made by UDOT. None of the defendant's property was used 
for the remodeled 1-15. R. 494. While not mentioned by Judge Roth, it is undisputed that 
both before and after the reconstruction of 1-15 access to Admiral Beverage's property 
was gained by use of 500 West. R. 657. 
Admiral Beverage's interlocutory appeal challenged the district court's orders 
granting UDOT's three motions in limine. UDOT's first motion asked that the defendant 
be precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of 
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property from 1-15. R. 151-63. UDOT's 
second motion challenged the appraisal prepared by Jerry Webber because it included the 
same loss-of-visibility damages excluded by the district court's prior order. R. 727-35. 
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Webber said he was unable to separate damages caused 
from loss of view (out) from damages caused by loss of visibility (in). R. 774; Brief of 
Appellant at 15-16. UDOT's third motion asked that severance damages claimed to be 
caused by changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property be 
excluded. R. 656-64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Admiral Beverage argues that the fair market value of its property has been 
diminished by the loss of visibility caused by the reconstruction of 1-15. It claims that a 
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state constitutional taking has occurred and it should be compensated for this loss of 
visibility. Supplemental Brief of Defendant / Petitioner at 31-46. But to state a takings 
claim, defendant must have a protectable property interest. 
Loss of view damages are caused by obstructions that block the view out from that 
portion of the property that was not condemned. Loss of visibility damages are caused by 
obstructions that block the view into the noncondemned portion of the property from a 
roadway or highway. 
Utah has never recognized a protected property interest in a loss of visibility. Loss 
of visibility is a claim for lost business profits caused by a change in the traffic flow or in 
the ability of traffic to see into the landowner's property. Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 
2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802, followed the prior decisions of this Court in holding that no 
such protected property interest existed. 
This Court has expressly held that Utah does not recognize a damage claim based 
on a property's loss of visibility (in) from a roadway. Utah law has repeatedly rejected 
efforts to create a property right in the flow of traffic on the public roads past a certain 
piece of land. 
But Ivers did err by departing from this Court's prior decisions in creating a new 
property right for loss of view that had not previously existed. Defendant's property does 
not abut 1-15. The land is on the west side of 500 West, which it abuts, while 1-15 is to 
the east of 500 West. The appurtenant easement of view (out) is a property right that 
attaches only to the abutting roadway (500 West), not to other property or roadways. 
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Ivers extended the property right of a loss of view to include not only damages 
caused by construction on the condemned piece of property, but to obstructions that are 
built on other parcels of property in which the claimant never had a property interest. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse this part of Ivers and reaffirm the prior law of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
Whether severance damages are sought under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution or Utah's statutes, the result is the same. This Court has used the same 
definition for "damages" under the takings clause of the state constitution and the eminent 
domain statutes. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Croft. 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962). In relation to alleged damages suffered 
by property that was not actually condemned, such damages are limited to those available 
at common law or that involve some physical injury to the property. 
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial 
improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under 78-
34-10(3),... is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, 
or where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public 
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and 
which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special 
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. 
Croft, 373 P.2d at 699 (footnote omitted) (rejecting claim for damages to remaining 
property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not built on that 
portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned). See also Coleman, 795 P.2d at 626-627; 
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2009 UT App 99, ]99 208 P.3d 535 (the takings 
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provision of the Utah Constitution does not apply unless the claimant possesses a 
protectable interest in the property). This Court has used common law principles in 
interpreting the eminent domain statutes. 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law 
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the 
value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were 
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land 
taken." 
State v. Harvey Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, Tfll, 57 P.3d 1088 (alteration and first 
emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 
The defendant had the duty to demonstrate that it owned the claimed protected 
property interest and that the interest had been taken or damaged. 
Under article I, section 22, the takings analysis has two principal steps. 
First, the claimant must demonstrate "some protectible interest in property." 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). If the 
claimant possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then 
show that the interest has been "taken or damaged" by government action. 
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996). 
I. ADMIRAL BEVERAGE DOES NOT HAVE A PROTECTABLE 
INTEREST IN THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC PAST ITS PROPERTY 
Admiral Beverage has not challenged the view of Utah's courts that its alleged loss 
of visibility is a loss of traffic flow past its commercial property. Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate that it has a constitutionally protected interest in the flow of traffic on the 
highway near its property. Absent such an interest, no taking has occurred under the Utah 
Constitution. 
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To enjoy the protections of article I, section 22, an alleged property 
interest must be more "than a unilateral expectation of continued 
privileges." We have declined to find a taking in situations where the 
plaintiffs failed to prove a "vested legally enforceable interest." In contrast, 
we have acknowledged the protectable interest one acquires when they have 
obtained a "completed, consummated right for present or future 
enjoyment." 
Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 2010 UT 37, f 19, 235 P.3d 730 (footnotes omitted). 
Bingham involved a takings claim concerning groundwater. The plaintiffs had not 
followed the legal steps to appropriate the groundwater under their property for their use. 
Nevertheless, they claimed that the city, in using this water, had taken their property 
rights in the water without compensation. In rejecting the plaintiffs5 takings claim, this 
Court explained that: 
Stripped to its essence, the Group's claimed interest in the water table 
is analogous to the "unilateral expectation of continued privileges" that we 
have held is insufficient to support a takings claim. Without having 
lawfully appropriated this water, the Group lacked a claim of entitlement to 
the continued presence of water in its soil. Without this degree of 
entitlement, the Group's interest does not fall within the protections of 
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
IcL at f 30 (footnote omitted). 
It did not matter what a willing buyer might have paid for the continued use of the 
groundwater. Because the plaintiffs only had a unilateral expectation of continued 
enjoyment of the groundwater, they could not state a takings claim. 
"However, to create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish rights 
more substantial in nature than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or 
benefits." Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d 1095,1099 (Utah 1995). In Bagford. this 
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Court held that a garbage collection company did not have a protectable property interest 
in continuing to serve certain customers. Ephraim City passed a garbage ordinance 
requiring all city residents to pay for city operated garbage collection, regardless of 
whether they used the city service. Plaintiffs claimed that this constituted a taking of their 
ongoing business with customers in the city. In rejecting this claim, this Court explained 
that: 
Their business in Ephraim City was based only on the expectation of being 
able to continue doing business there, not on a legal right to do so. It 
follows that their investment of money in the expectation that they would be 
able to continue their business in Ephraim City indefinitely is not a 
protectable property interest. 
Id at 1100. 
Admiral Beverage cannot state a takings claim unless it can show it had a 
protectable property interest. But Utah has never recognized a claim for loss of visibility. 
Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected 
property right in visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result, 
the court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present 
evidence of claimed damage to their property caused by a loss of visibility 
of the property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have a protected 
interest in the visibility of their property from an abutting road, even if part 
of their land has been taken in the process. 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, we concluded that the 
"rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an 
abutting owner on a street. We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property 
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his 
premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle 
the owner to compensation." Similarly, a property owner has no 
recognized property right to free and unrestricted visibility of his property 
bypassing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate 
compensation. 
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The speculative nature of the damages sought in a claim for loss of 
visibility further supports this conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly 
noted, a claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for compensation 
for lost business profits. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
simply does not create a protectable property interest in the mere hope of 
future sales from passing traffic. 
Because property owners have no protectable property interest in 
visibility, the trial court was correct in granting the motion in limine on this 
issue, and the court of appeals was correct in affirming. 
Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ^[12-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Ivers simply followed prior precedent on this issue. Utah has long rejected claims 
by property owners to a vested interest in continued access to the motoring public. In 
Robinett v. Price. 74 Utah 512, 280 P. 736 (1929), the plaintiffs commercial property 
was separated from the business district of the City of Price by railroad tracks. The city 
closed the road over the tracks that provided direct access to his property. The result was 
that anyone trying to reach his property from the business district had to take a circuitous 
route. He alleged that the fair market value of his property, and the rent he could charge, 
was significantly reduced by the city's action. 
Though the travel over Ninth street is somewhat more inconvenient in 
going to and from plaintiffs property to Main street and to the business 
portion of the city than was the former route enjoyed by him, and though 
the value and the rental value of his property may have, as contended by 
him, been decreased by such change of route, yet such inconvenience and 
injury are not in kind and degree special entitling the plaintiff to 
compensation for resulting loss or injury occasioned thereby. 
280P.2dat737. 
In State v. Rozzelle. 101 Utah 464,120 P.2d 276 (1941), a gasoline station on the 
defendant's land had abutted the previous highway. The new highway could only be 
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reached indirectly from the gasoline station. The landowner sought damages for lost 
profits for that portion of his property (including the gasoline station) that was not 
condemned. The majority of the Court held that the landowner had not shown a causal 
connection between the condemnation and the alleged lost profits. In his concurrence, 
Justice Wolfe went further. 
The respondents seek damages, not for any physical detriment to their 
property because of a change in grade with a consequent loss of value for 
the purposes for which suited, but damages due to a decrease in value for 
the purposes of soliciting and catering to the public, the opportunity for 
which has been greatly lessened by the removal of the road. I am in accord 
with the principle laid down in the opinion to the effect that abutting owners 
have no rights in the convenient accessability of the public to their place, 
the loss of which would mean loss of business. Any losses resulting from 
unreasonably cutting off their own access to their property or unreasonably 
interfering with their light and air given by reason of their abutting on a 
public highway are compensable. But not the loss of flow of traffic from the 
street into their place of business. The law does not give them a vested right 
in the business which travel along a public highway may have afforded 
them. 
120 P.2d at 278 (emphasis added). 
Justice McDonough also concurred. "I also concur in what is said by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe to the effect that diminution in value of the realty caused by the loss of the flow of 
traffic to or past defendant's place of business is not compensable." Id. 
Wolfe's concurrence was cited as the law of Utah by a unanimous court in Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Hislop. 12 Utah 2d 64, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (1961) 
(claim by tavern owner for damages caused by loss of flow of traffic). 
Appellant's argument assumes that a landowner has a property right 
in the flow of traffic on a highway adjacent to his property. This is not so. 
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The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other 
vested right in the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not 
entitled to compensation when that flow of traffic is diminished as a result 
of eminent domain proceedings. 
362 P.2d at 581 (footnote omitted). See also Utah Road Comm'n v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 
305, 383 P.2d 917, 920 (1963) ("It is settled in this jurisdiction that the landowner has no 
property right in the flow of traffic on a public highway.") (footnote omitted). 
Establishment and regulation of traffic movement is a function of state police 
powers, and the fact that 1-15 may bring traffic near the property does not create a vested 
right. The government may direct the traffic elsewhere without a claim for loss of 
property rights. 
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include any 
right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to have 
such traffic pass by one's abutting property. The reason is that all traffic on 
public highways is controlled by the police power of the State, and what the 
police power may give an abutting property owner in the way of traffic on 
the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the State 
and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic 
Hampton v. Rd. Comm'n. 21 Utah 2d 342,445 P.2d 708, 711 (1968) (quoting State 
Highway Common v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Mo. 1965). 
Admiral Beverage has failed to cite any Utah precedent that recognized a property 
right in the continued flow of traffic past a landowner's property. Ivers properly relied 
upon this Court's prior decisions to find that a landowner had no protectable property 
interest in the flow of traffic under the name of a loss of visibility. 
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Plaintiff has failed to distinguish between the police power, which is 
used to regulate and the power of eminent domain, which is used to acquire 
property from private ownership. A property owner has no property right to 
a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his premises, and any impairment 
or interference with this flow does not entitle the owner to compensation. 
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974). 
Miya and Hampton were followed by this Court in State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107, 
f l4, 57 P.3d 1088 (right of access does not include right to continued public traffic). 
Ivers, following established Utah law, held again that there was no protectable interest in 
the flow of traffic past a parcel of land. Without such a property right, defendant cannot 
state a takings claim under the Utah Constitution. 
II. IVERS'S EXPANSION OF THE APPURTENANT EASEMENT 
OF VIEW SO AS TO BURDEN OTHER PROPERTIES SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED 
As the defendant acknowledges, this Court's ruling in Ivers "expanded the prior 
law that limited severance damage awards to situations where the view-impairing 
structure is built directly on the condemned land and causes damage to the remainder 
property." Supplemental Brief of Defendant / Petitioner at 12. In doing so, Ivers 
inappropriately expanded the appurtenant easement of view so that it burdened not only 
the abutting road but all other parcels of property that might be part of the same road 
construction project. 
Ivers correctly stated the prior status of Utah law. 
In Miya, Harvey Real Estate, and D'Ambrosio, we concluded that 
when the state condemns a portion of land and builds a view-impairing 
structure directly on that land, the damage to the remaining property is 
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recoverable. This is because when the condemned land is used for the 
construction of the view-impairing structure, the damage to the remaining 
property is clearly caused by the severance. 
Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 2007 UT 19, f20, 154 P.3d 802. 
It then erred by expanding the appurtenant easement of view to apply not only to 
obstructions build on the condemned property, but to any view-impairing structure built 
as part of the same construction project so long as the condemned property was essential 
to the completion of the project as a whole. Id. at f 21. This alteration of Utah's law 
should be overruled. 
Where Ivers erred was in expanding the appurtenant easement of view so that it 
burdened other property than the abutting roadway. Judge Roth's decision on the first 
motions in limine (entered before Ivers) correctly sets out Utah's prior law. R. 499-500. 
Severance damages were limited to those caused by the take itself or from 
improvements built on the condemned portion of the property. 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' 
property and the construction of improvements thereon are not 
compensable. Such damages suffered generally by all the property owners 
in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the 
parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement 
on that part causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
The damages sought by defendants were due to the construction of 
the highway and its proximity to their residential property. These damages 
were not occasioned by the taking of parcel 69:a and are not different in 
nature from the damages suffered from all other property owners in the area 
whose property was not taken. Such damages were originally identified by 
defendants as consequential in nature. This characterization was correct. 
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio. 743 P.2d 1220,1221-22 (Utah 1987). 
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Defendant is not entitled to severance damages for a loss of view caused by an 
obstruction that was built on a different parcel of land. Unless he had some property right 
to control that other parcel, the owner would be free to build any lawful structure thereon 
regardless of how it might obstruct the view from the defendant's land. In Bd. ofEduc. v. 
Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962), this Court rejected a claim for damages to the 
remaining property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not 
built on that portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned. 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law 
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the 
value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were 
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land 
taken." 
State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107 at f 11 (alteration and first emphasis in original, second 
emphasis added). 
The court of appeals in Ivers correctly applied Utah law: 
[B]ecause Arby's loss of view . . . was not caused by the 
severance of its property or the construction of an 
improvement thereon, it is not entitled to severance damages. 
State v. Ivers, 2005 UT App 519, TJ24, 128 P.3d 74. 
These statements are consistent with the doctrine of servient and dominant estates 
because the rights of the adjacent landowner are only rights appurtenant and do not 
restrict what the burdened landowner can do with his own property so long as the 
easement appurtenant is not violated. If the Court reaches this issue, this portion of the 
Ivers decision should be overruled as being contrary to Utah law. 
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But this Court does not need to reach this issue. Even under Ivers, the defendant's 
claims were properly rejected. It is undisputed that the defendant's property does not 
abut 1-15. Defendant's property is divided and separated from 1-15 by 500 West, a street 
owned by Salt Lake City. This physical condition existed both before and after the 1-15 
reconstruction. As part of the 1-15 reconstruction project, Salt Lake City's 500 West was 
moved by UDOT further to the west, partially on land taken from the defendant due to the 
expansion of the freeway onto part of Salt Lake City's land. Under Utah law, the 
defendant can not claim damages for loss of view caused by changes made to a public 
road that his property did not abut. 
Utah has long recognized that an owner of land that abuts a public road enjoys 
rights of easement of access, air, light, and view to the public road. In Dooly Block v. 
Salt Lake Rapid Transit 33 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1893), this Court explained that abutting 
property owners had the right of access to the street "subject only to the ordinary use of 
the same for the purposes of public travel, and that they are entitled to the use of said 
street, free from unreasonable obstructions, as a means of access, light, and air to their 
premises." 
The appurtenant rights of air, light, and view discussed in Dooly Block and Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miya. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are companion to, and 
derivative of, the easement for physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are 
easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute 
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property rights forming part of the ownerfs estate." Miya, 526 P.2d at 928.l As such, 
they create no right greater than the right to physical access. They consist of the right to 
use the public street for access, light, air, and view. They impose no greater burden on 
the public right of way than the servitude necessary to provide the right of access. 
These rights are properly described as rights, or easements, appurtenant to property 
that abuts a public street. Abut is defined as "[t]o reach; to touch. . . . No intervening 
land." Black's Law Dictionary 11 (5th ed. 1979). To claim an appurtenant easement, a 
landowner must meet two requirements. First, the land in question must abut the roadway 
in question. Second, the roadway must be a public road. Okemo Mountain. Inc. v. 
Ludlow. 762 A.2d 1219, 1225 (Vt. 2000). 
Abutting owners have certain private rights which are not common 
to the public generally, such as the rights of view, of light and air, and of 
lateral support, but these rights are subordinate to the right of passage of 
the public, and are subject to reasonable regulation and restriction. 
An abutting owner has two distinct kinds of rights in a highway: a 
public right which he or she enjoys in common with all other citizens, and 
certain private rights which arise from his or her ownership of property 
contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the public 
generally, and this is the case regardless of whether or not the fee of the 
highway is in him or her. These rights are property of which he or she may 
not be deprived without his or her consent, except on full compensation and 
by due process of law. 
39A C.J.S. Highways § 140 (Westlaw through June 2009) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
1
 "An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of 
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just 
compensation." Id. at 929. 
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These appurtenant easements apply only to the abutting roadway and not to any 
other road or property. "This state has long recognized that a landowner owning property 
abutting a public street possesses as appurtenant to his lot implied easements for light, air 
and view over the public street. These easements extend to the full width of the street and 
are independent of any fee interest in the street held by the landowner.55 Haeussler v. 
Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1981). The right of view does not pass beyond the public 
roadway and cross out the other side. Neither does it travel laterally up and down the 
highway. The right does not extend across the abutting roadway to burden private and 
public property on the other side of the public street to guarantee a view over such 
property. Utah's courts have regularly described the right as one of reasonable access to 
and from the property to use the public road. 
The interest protected simply entails the "right of ingress and egress to and 
from . . . property and the abutting public highway." Harvey's property may 
be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road; 
consequently, its right of access has not been denied. The right does not 
extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property will be 
accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his 
property will be easily accessed from other thoroughfares. 
State v. Harvey, 2002 UT 107 at f 14 (citation omitted). 
This approach to the rights appurtenant is also incorporated into Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-1-102(11) (West 2004), which defines a limited-access facility as 
a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to 
which neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons 
have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view. 
19 
The courts of other states have also followed the general rule that a landowner 
does not have appurtenant easements over the property of their neighbors. These 
easements only apply to the public road that abuts their property. 
As a general matter, a landowner cannot recover from a neighboring 
landowner simply because he dislikes the use to which the second 
landowner put his property. Thus, a landowner could not recover from his 
neighbor just because the other had erected a building on his own property 
which blocked the view from the first owner's land, or the visibility of the 
first owner's land. The only way to prevent a neighbor from constructing a 
building which would block one's view is to buy an easement of view. The 
logical implication of this position is that a property owner has no right to 
an unobstructed line of vision to his property from anywhere off of his 
property, absent an easement of some sort. 
8.960 Square Feet v. State. 806 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Alaska 1991) (citation and footnotes 
omitted). See also Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 778 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. App. 1989) 
("The general rule appears to be that a building or structure cannot be complained of as a 
nuisance merely because it obstructs the view of neighboring property."). 
It is undisputed that Admiral Beverage's property does not abut 1-15. It has at all 
times abutted 500 West, not the freeway. The freeway was built, and remains today, on 
property found on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's land. Defendant's 
appurtenant easements pertain to 500 West and not to 1-15. Judge Faust's decision 
correctly took this fact into consideration. "Defendant is able to assert claims for any 
severance damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West." R. 863. The district court correctly applied Utah law and was properly 
affirmed by the court of appeals. 
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CONCLUSION 
Admiral Beverage does not have a protectable property interest in the flow of 
traffic past its property (loss of visibility). Even under Ivers, defendant's appurtenant 
easement of view has not been damaged. If it had been, the expanded right to view 
created in Ivers should be overruled. For these reasons, the respondent urges this Court to 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 2010. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent 
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Case No. 970905368CD 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect 
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on 
the parties* competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
?005 where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave 10 Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31,2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background. 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the I-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
dentified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
nowi 
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Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the f r e e l y wall reaching a heigh, of about 28 feet a, a point about six tnches outside 
and to the west of the southeast comer of parcel 109, the former southeast comer of the Admiral 
property, and about 62 fee, from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the 
A ,i„„ ' While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on thai property. 
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of jus, 
condemnation for the taking of parcels .09 and 1.0. Adrmral appears ,0 have only minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued onasquare-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
,„e remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses, 
Admiral claims that the market valueofthe remaining property has been reduced by«(a)lossofair, 
l i i n l , view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic .raveling on ,he 
^constructed 1-15 freeway . . . . » Admiral's Memorandum in Support of i,s Motion in Limine ,o 
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition ,0 Plaintiffs 
• AHmiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually bu.1t 
• .• t, t hcLtfomer of plcel 109. based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
„,„,,„ the sou heas^corner „,
 p ^ ^ ^ u D o T ^ ^ 
ST1 t^Affidav oTKeith Hafen, a more de.ai.ed survey that showed the wall, a, ,s nearest 
90
 w
 n ™ v done which confirmed that the wall was omside of parcel 09, although four to f v 
;„r"a,rcloses"point rather than six, a difference tha, is no, materia, to the tssues before the 
court. 
o -
Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law. 
B. Analysis, 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to 
fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining 
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for Joss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in toto by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impression in Utah. 
1. Logs of Visibility. 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of LI 5 passing by the Admiral 
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration. 
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance in this area. 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting propenv do not include an interest in the iraffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v. 
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that "the right of ingress or 
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earess to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 71L The court 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "'damnum absque 
injuria'" or damage without legal injury. 
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1961) ("The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the 
owner to compensation/'); Utah Department ofTransportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT107, 
1114 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other 
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a 
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how-
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it. results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
anv meaningful way- The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited. 1-15 is. a "[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view/' U.CA. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway: 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/1 andowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights. 
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People « rei Depormen, of Transport , Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994) 
.citation .c Ricardi -mine* The court no.ed ,ha, .he purpose of roads or highways is .0 allow 
access from abutting private property and ,0 allow travelers along ,he road o, highway »,o view a 
business, drive into fc pa™nize it, and reenter the highway" bu, .ha. "[s]uch purposes are 
antagonistic .o ,he pu^ose of a freeway," which is designed .0 •"preven, jus, tha, sort of thing.'" 
U. (ci.a.ions omitted)- The court wen. on .0 discuss a California s.a.u.e similar in import .0 Utah's: 
p„r tha, reason. S,ree,s ond Highway Code seaion 23.5 provides thai owners of 
2 , in lands .0 a freeway have limited or no right of access .0 or from therr abutting 
land" Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related nghts such as the 
right to a view. 
Jd 
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a view of his property from the freeway." 
2. OtherJ2amages, 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility 
and aesthetics." a bundle of rights that may include, bu, goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15 
freeway/' The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the 
circumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road. 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya, in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 ofTransportation v. D 'A mbrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Id at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the 
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in te rsectionclosure^asmadeposs^ 
UT 107, 112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from 
movements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the 
broad language of U.CA. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder 
from the taking of a portion of the property and from <Hhe construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed: 
Action 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
hv the construction of the improvement made on the severed property, t does not 
dven the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
given 
of the construction project. 
* * * 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department transportation v. D^rnbroso 
^ P2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78o4-10(2). 
m r e we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
™Z Zed of property where the taking or the construction ojthe improvement on 
Itoaruau^ry 'to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added. 
Ou ho ding today also accords with the well-established common law pnncple that 
leranc daUges "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner s severance: dam g y ^ ^ ^ ^
 by {he /akmg 
§368(1996) (emphasis added) 
Id. at 1110-11 (interpolations a " d ™P h a s i s in , h e 0 r i 8 i n a 1 , S O n K C f t a , i ° n S 0 m i " e d ) ' 
B e court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
j u s t outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as par. of 
.nereconstructionprcject are no, compensate as severance damages underUtah lav,, disappears 
,„ inCude evidence related to ali of "the components of severance damages" ,ha, were ^aken into 
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated a, paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robe* 
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2 
ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
DATED this j5/_ day of October, 2005. 
Stephen L. Roth i^ ° 
DISTRICT JUDGE $ 
2
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in 
Limine . . . , at 6-JO. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level because it would involve a depanure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests, 
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change, in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
P l a i n t i f f / 
vs . 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
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UDOT'$ Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and 
concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages 
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December 
18 2007/ at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review of the 
pleadinas and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31st, 2005 
issued by Judge Both in this case, che Court grants UDOT' s Motions in 
Limine. The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West* 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of xhe Court. 
Dated this 24zn day of December, 2007. 
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December 18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review 
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2005 issued by Judge Roth in this case, the Court grants UDOT's Motion 
in Limine. The Court refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
elating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this 24 th day of December, 2007. 
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